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Abstract
We examine the performance attributes of a merchant transmission investment
framework that relies on “market driven” transmission investment to provide the
infrastructure to support competitive wholesale markets for electricity. Under a
stringent set of assumptions, the merchant investment model has a remarkable
set of attributes that appear to solve the natural monopoly problem and the as-
sociated need for regulating transmission companies traditionally associated with
electric transmission networks. We expand the merchant model upon which these
conclusions are based to incorporate imperfections in wholesale electricity markets,
lumpiness in transmission investment opportunities, stochastic attributes of trans-
mission networks and associated property rights deﬁnition issues, the eﬀects of the
behavior of system operators and transmission owners on transmission capacity and
reliability, coordination and bargaining considerations, forward contract, commit-
ment and asset speciﬁcity issues. Incorporating these more realistic attributes of
transmission networks and the behavior of transmission owners and system opera-
tors signiﬁcantly undermines the attractive properties of the merchant investment
model. Relying primarily on a market driven investment framework to govern in-
vestment in electric transmission networks is likely to lead to ineﬃcient investment
decisions and undermine the performance of competitive markets for electricity. A
signiﬁcant research challenge is to design regulatory mechanisms for system op-
erators and incumbent transmission owners and a better framework for deﬁning
transmission property rights that will stimulate eﬃcient investments by regulated
incumbent transmission owners and by merchant entrants responding to market
opportunities when they are the most eﬃcient suppliers.
∗We would like to thank Richard Green, Shmuel Oren, Masheed Rosenqvist, Steven Stoft, and Frank
Wolak for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
†MIT. Research support from the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research and the
Cambridge-MIT Institute is gratefully acknowledged.
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1 Introduction
Many countries are in the process of restructuring their electric power sectors to promote
the developing of competitive wholesale and retail electricity markets. These programs
involve unbundling the generation of electricity and the retail marketing of electricity from
the transmission and distribution of electricity, creating competitive wholesale and retail
markets for these services, and providing access to the transmission and distribution net-
works which provide the infrastructure platforms that support these competitive markets.
Economic research supporting these developments has mostly focused on the organization
and functioning of spot markets for energy and other generation services (e.g. operating
reserves and frequency regulation). This theoretical and empirical research has analyzed,
among other things, the organization of day-ahead and real time (balancing) energy mar-
kets and associated auction rules, the role of bilateral contracts, congestion management,
nodal pricing, physical and ﬁnancial transmission contracts, and associated market power
issues. This work typically takes the transmission network as given, assumes that there
is a ﬁxed non-stochastic amount of transmission capacity available on the network, that
the available capacity is unaﬀected by decisions made by the transmission owner and
system operator, and that this capacity is common knowledge to all market participants,
transmission owners and the system operator.
In reality, even in the short run, the capacity of a transmission network is stochastic
as a consequence of facility outages and variations in external conditions such as weather.
Moreover, the actual capacity of the transmission network under any particular set of
supply and demand conditions depends on decisions made by the transmission owner
(TO) (e.g. maintenance) and the system operator (SO) (e.g. actions designed to achieve
target risks of system failures), which may (as in England and Wales) or may not (as in
California and PJM) be the same entity. In the medium and long term as demand grows
and new generating capacity is added to replace older less eﬃcient capacity or to meet
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growing demand eﬃciently, investments in transmission capacity are likely to be necessary
to minimize the overall costs of wholesale electricity supplies, to maintain reliability, to
mitigate locational market power, and to improve the performance of competitive whole-
sale and retail markets. Indeed, most new investments in generation of any signiﬁcant
size must be accompanied by expansions of the transmission network.
Decisions regarding investments in new generation (including location) and transmis-
sion facilities are inherently interdependent. A new generator requires at least some
supporting investment to connect it to the network. More interestingly, additional invest-
ments to expand generating capacity may be ineﬃcient if the increased power ﬂows from
the new generator increase network congestion costs, constrain the operation of low-cost
generating plants at particular locations, or reduce reliability. In addition, the locations
chosen by new generators, and retirement decisions by existing generators at particular
locations, will depend, in part, on forecasts of network congestion that may aﬀect prices
for generation service at diﬀerent locations over many years into the future.1 Finally,
when there is transmission congestion, market power may be enhanced at particular loca-
tions where competition is limited by import constraints into the area. Locational market
power leads to ineﬃciencies from dead-weight losses resulting from deviations of prices
from marginal costs, from ineﬃcient entry and other rent-seeking behavior, and from
alternative imperfect market power regulatory mechanisms such as price caps.
When the electric power industry was made up of regulated vertically integrated mo-
nopolies, decisions about investments in generation and transmission and associated loca-
tional decisions were typically made jointly by the same ﬁrm, arguably internalising these
interdependencies. In addition, potential market power problems that can arise when the
1Generator location decisions depend on many variables include the availability and price of land, the
availability of cooling water, the costs of transporting fuel, the costs of connecting to the network, and the
costs of congestion on the network at diﬀerent locations. Generators’ decisions to continue operating once
investments have been sunk are likely to be more sensitive to locational prices for energy and operating
reserves.
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prices generators can charge for power are deregulated, were not an issue for regulated
vertically integrated ﬁrms and their investment decisions did not take such market power
considerations into account (Joskow 2002). Accordingly, in restructured electricity sec-
tors where generation and transmission investment decisions are made independently and
power prices deregulated, some governance framework must be found to facilitate eﬃcient
coordination of generation and transmission investments and to account for the short run
and long run social costs of congestion, changes in reliability and market power.
Despite the importance of developing such a governance structure, and growing prob-
lems associated with stimulating transmission investment in many restructured electricity
markets, there has been surprisingly little research on the institutions governing trans-
mission investment in restructured competitive wholesale electricity markets. Early for-
mulations of the structure for competitive wholesale markets envisioned the creation of
independent regulated regional transmission and system operating entities (Transcos) that
would be responsible for building, owning and operating transmission facilities and would
be subject to economic regulation (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983). More recent research
has explored the attributes of incentive regulatory mechanisms that could be applied to
such regulated transmission monopolies (e.g. Celebi, Nasser 1997, Le´autier 2000, Vogel-
sang 2001) to integrate energy price (congestion) signals with transmission investment.
We refer to this approach as a regulated Transco (or regulated Transmission Company)
model. The institutional arrangements governing transmission operation and investment
in England and Wales reﬂect this basic institutional approach. The regulated Transco
model is necessarily subject to the classical challenges of regulated monopoly of how to
specify and apply regulatory mechanisms that provide good performance incentives to
the regulated ﬁrm while minimizing the economic rents that the regulated ﬁrm can earn
given the asymmetry of information between the regulator and the regulated ﬁrm.
An alternative (or complement) to the regulated Transco model relies on decentral-
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ized property-rights based institutions to govern transmission investment (Hogan 1992;
Bushnell and Stoft 1996,1997; Chao and Peck 1996). The hope is that by relying on
competitive “market driven” transmission investment, the imperfections associated with
the institution of regulated monopoly can be avoided. The market-based approaches en-
vision new transmission investment creating transmission rights for the merchant investor
(either physical or ﬁnancial as described in Joskow and Tirole 2000)2 based on the in-
crease of the capacity of the network to transfer power from points of injection to points
of consumption. The value of these transmission rights, which are typically equated to
the expected congestion charges either avoided (physical rights) or rebated by the system
operator (ﬁnancial rights) over the life of the transmission investment, then provides the
ﬁnancial incentive for incumbent suppliers or new entrants to invest in new transmission
capacity. We call this the merchant transmission model and its attributes are the focus
of this paper.
Research on this model has focused almost entirely on simple cases where transmission
investments are characterized by no increasing returns to scale, there are no sunk cost or
asset speciﬁcity issues, nodal energy prices fully reﬂect consumers’ willingness to pay for
energy and reliability, all network externalities are internalised in nodal prices, transmis-
sion network constraints and associated point-to-point capacity is non-stochastic, there is
no market power, markets are always cleared by prices, there is a full set of futures mar-
kets, and the TO/SO has no discretion to aﬀect the eﬀective transmission capacity and
nodal prices over time. Under these assumptions it can be demonstrated (a) that eﬃcient
transmission investments that create transmission rights satisfying certain simultaneous
feasibility constraints will be proﬁtable and (b) that ineﬃcient transmission investments
will not be proﬁtable (Hogan 1992; Bushnell and Stoft 1996,1997). These two results are
the primary economic foundation for relying on a merchant transmission model. While
2As we will discuss, however, the nature of the rights that are typically assumed in the literature
appear to be poorly adapted to important physical attributes of transmission networks.
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there has been some recognition that relaxing these assumptions undermines key results
regarding the optimality of merchant investment (e.g, Hogan 1992, pp.228-230, Bushnell
and Stoft 1996, 1997; Oren et al 1995), little analysis of more realistic cases has been
forthcoming (Perez-Arriaga et al, 1995 is an exception).
In this paper we examine the performance attributes of this new merchant transmission
investment and ownership framework when assumptions that better reﬂect the physical
and economic attributes of real transmission network are introduced. We show that a
variety of potentially signiﬁcant performance problems then arise. While the focus of our
analysis is electric transmission networks, several of the issues that we address arise in
connection with decentralized market driven investments in network infrastructure capac-
ity in other sectors, including railroads, highways, and gas pipeline networks. The paper
proceeds in the following way. The next section provides additional background regarding
competitive wholesale electricity market institutions, the allocation and pricing of scarce
transmission capacity, transmission rights, and the nature of investments in transmission
capacity. Section 3 then outlines the attributes of the basic merchant transmission model
that has appeared in the literature and the case for its attractive performance atributes.
In the sections that follow, we examine how these results are aﬀected by imperfections in
wholesale energy markets, lumpy transmission investments, the stochastic properties of
transmission capacity and the associated deﬁnitions of property rights, network operator
behavior, coordination issues, and extensions to account for loop ﬂow. We ﬁnd that the
attractive properties of the merchant transmission model are seriously undermined when
more realistic characterizations of transmission networks are introduced.
2 Merchant transmission investment: background
No restructured electric power industry has adopted a pure merchant transmission model
of the type described above, though Australia has adopted a mixed merchant and regu-
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lated transmission model.3 However, recent academic proposals,4 as well as FERC’s July
2002 Standard Market Design (SMD) proposals, call for relying primarily on “market
driven” transmission investments, while recognizing that at least some regulated trans-
mission investments may be necessary.5 The extreme version of market driven investment
relies entirely on free entry of investors into the activity of constructing transmission lines
and no regulation of the prices that they can charge. The owners of these transmission
lines are rewarded through the congestion rents associated with these lines.
Transmission investment institutions cannot be considered independently of the insti-
tutions that govern the determination of energy prices, operating reserves, contingency
constraints, congestion management, and the speciﬁcation of transmission capacity and
increments to it. No single paradigm has emerged from the liberalization eﬀort of the
last decade for these attributes of the design and operation of wholesale markets, system
operations, and congestion management. So, to evaluate the properties of alternative
transmission investment frameworks we need to be more precise about the organization
of the wholesale market, congestion management and price determination to understand
and evaluate alternative institutional frameworks to govern transmission investment. In
what follows we will assume that a nodal or locational marginal pricing (LMP) system
is in place with attributes similar to those being proposed by the U.S. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) in its SMD proposals and to what is in operation in New
3Two merchant lines supported by diﬀerences in spot prices in the two market areas they connect have
been placed in operation under this arrangement in Australia. Directlink is a 180 MW, 40 mile merchant
DC link connecting Queensland and New South Wales and began operating in 2000. Murraylink is a
220 MW, 108 mile merchant DC link connecting South Australia and Victoria which began operating
in October 2002. On October 18, 2002, Murraylink applied to the regulatory authorities in Australia to
change its status from a merchant line to a regulated line that would be compensated based on traditional
cost of service principles combined with a performance incentive mechanism. Neither merchant link
appears to be proﬁtable. As far as we can tell, these are the only two merchant transmission lines
operating anywhere in the world that have been built in anticipation of recovering their costs entirely
from congestion rents arising from the diﬀerence in nodal prices.
4e.g., Hogan (2002).
5Remedying Undue Discrimination through Open Access Transmission Service and Standard Electricity
Market Design, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, July 31, 2002.
See in particular ¶335–351.
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York and PJM in the U.S. This is the most conducive framework for merchant investment
because nodal prices provide a measure of locational scarcity.
Under this model, an independent system operator (ISO)6 operates a real-time bal-
ancing market and allocates scarce transmission capacity using bids from generators and
consumers to increase or decrease generation or demand at each node. That is, the ISO
takes all of the bids (generation and demand) and ﬁnds the “least cost” set of uniform
market-clearing price bids to balance supply and demand at each generation and con-
sumption node on the network using a security constrained dispatch model that takes
transmission constraints into account. This establishes day-ahead quantity commitments
and nodal prices that vary by location when there is congestion. The resulting nodal
prices reﬂect both congestion and marginal losses. Generators may enter into bilateral
contracts with marketers or load serving entities (LSEs) and schedule supplies with the
ISO separately from the organized day-ahead market. However, they still have to pay any
congestion charges associated with their schedules based on the diﬀerence in nodal prices
between the injection and receipt points. The day-ahead schedules, nodal prices, and
congestion charges are “commitments.” They can be adjusted in real time by submitting
adjustment bids to the real time balancing markets (which again rely on bids, a security
constrained dispatch and nodal prices) to allow these schedules to be changed based on
real time physical and economic conditions.
The FERC SMD model recognizes that there are incumbent regulated transmission
owners (TO) that own the existing transmission assets and requires that the SO and TO
be separate entities and operate independently.7 The incumbent TO receives some cost-
of-service compensation for the usage of a grid that it no longer controls to compensate
it for legacy investments and ongoing maintenance costs. New investments in transmis-
6Renamed Independent Transmission Provider (ITP) in the FERC proposal.
7Exactly what functions are assigned to the TO and what functions to the SO is a subject of continuing
debate and depends in part on whether the TO is “independent” of generators and marketers that use
its facilities to participate in the wholesale market.
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sion are anticipated to be made by competing merchant investors whose compensation is
based on the value of Congestion Revenue Rights (CRRs)8 created by their investments.9
These ﬁnancial rights represent the right to receive congestion revenues deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between the locational prices between the two nodes (point-to-point) covered
by the relevant CRR times the quantity of CRRs held. In Joskow and Tirole (2000) we
deﬁned these rights as representing a share of the congestion revenues (or merchandizing
surplus) earned by the system operator. This formulation implies that the obligations to
pay rights holders is always the same as the congestion revenues earned by the system
operator. Under FERC’s proposed formulation, however, the quantity of point to point
ﬁnancial rights is ﬁxed ex ante and allocated to holders to reﬂect estimates of the capacity
of the network to accommodate schedules that fully utilize these rights under “normal
operating conditions.” In this case, deviations between actual transmission capacity and
the number of allocated rights results either in the congestion revenues earned by the
SO being too little to fully cover the associated ﬁnancial obligations to rights holders or
in congestion revenues in excess of what is owed to rights holders. For example, if K
rights are issued to inject power at node 1 and receive it at node 2, the rights holders are
owed K(p2 − p1), where p1 and p2 are the prices at the 2 nodes. If the actual capacity of
the network turns out to be Ka then the system operator will have a congestion revenue
deﬁcit or surplus equal to (K −Ka)(p2 − p1).
The separation between transmission ownership (TO) and network dispatch (system
8Congestion Revenue Rights is the name FERC has now given to ﬁnancial rights that have been
referred to in the literature as Transmission Congestion Contracts (TCCs) or Financial Transmission
Rights (FTRs).
9While the FERC SMD reﬂects a preference to rely on “market driven” transmission investments,
it recognizes that because market forces “may not” yield eﬃcient transmission investment and provides
backstop investment policies. The primary backup policy proposed was some type of (largely undeﬁned)
competitive RFP process, with regulated investments by incumbent transmission owners considered to be
a “last resort.” Responding the comments received since the SMD rules were proposed, as this is written,
the competitive RFP proposal appears to be oﬀ the table, and some combination of merchant investment
and regulated incumbent TO investment mediated through a regional planning process appears to be
gaining favor.
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operating or SO) functions in this model is motivated by two considerations. First, a
market driven transmission system leads to multiple owners of parts of the grid; while
the owners can form a cooperative to operate the grid, their goals are in general antago-
nistic,10 and it is well-known that cooperatives of members with heterogeneous interests
face complex governance problems.11 Second, and quite crucially, grid owners face a
serious potential conﬂict of interest when operating a transmission grid if their compen-
sation varies directly with the level of congestion rents. In practice, due to the lack of
market-based penalties for outages, dispatching does not quite correspond to the least-cost
optimization used in economic and engineering models; rather, grid operators have sub-
stantial discretion over how much outage risk they are willing to take while dispatching.12
This discretion in turn potentially provides incentives for system operators to manipulate
the congestion rents received by the owners (Glachant and Pignon, 2002). By conser-
vatively “withdrawing” transmission capacity (under the cover of a safe management of
the network), the system operator can substantially raise the congestion rents. Third,
in many countries there continues to be vertical integration between generation power
marketing and transmission. The creation of an independent SO is thought to be a way
to mitigate the potential problems that may arise from common ownership and control
of transmission and generating assets and associated power marketing activities. How-
ever, the separation of ownership (TO) and operations (SO) carries other potential costs
caused by ineﬃcient coordination between the SO and the TO. Accordingly, there is a
tradeoﬀ between integration of TO/SO functions and separation of these functions that
has largely been ignored in the literature and by policymakers. We examine the resulting
10Incumbent owners of transmission lines that are being compensated based on congestion rents will
have incentives to oppose investments by others in generation or transmission that reduce these congestion
rents. Generators located in congested areas will have incentives to oppose transmission enhancements
that would reduce or eliminate the congestion.
11See, e.g., Hansmann (1996).
12For example, the so-called (N-1) and (N-2) constraints are crude self-imposed constraints and are
subjective responses to the perceived risk.
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“moral hazard in teams” issues further below.
Finally, the restructuring of electric power systems to rely on competitive wholesale
markets does not start with a blank slate. There generally exists an extensive legacy
transmission network and an associated ﬂeet of generating plants. The conﬁguration of
these assets may not be “optimal” in the ex ante sense for at least two reasons. First,
supply and demand conditions are likely to have changed from what was assumed when
these investments were made. Second, the investments were not made to be optimally
conﬁgured to accommodate a decentralized competitive wholesale market. For example,
vertically integrated ﬁrms would not have taken local market power problems into account
since they would have had no incentive to exercise market power against themselves
(Joskow 2002). The conﬁguration of the legacy network must be taken into account
in the evaluation of alternative institutional arrangements to govern its operation and
investments to expand its capabilities.
For these reasons, we have found it useful to consider two types of transmission invest-
ments that can increase the capacity of the network (or, alternatively reduce congestion)
to accept injections of energy at a particular location A on the network for consumption
at another point B on the network.13
Network deepening investments: These are investments that involve physical upgrades of
the facilities on the incumbent’s existing network (e.g. adding capacitor banks, phase
shifters, reconductoring existing transmission links, upgrading transformers and substa-
tions, installing new communications and relay equipment spread around the network to
increase the speed with which the SO can respond to sudden equipment outages and re-
13We focus on transmission investments that aﬀect congestion on the high voltage network. Regulators
in the U.S. often break transmission investments down into additional categories. First, there are local
transmission investments “inside” the demand node. These investments are sometimes called “reliability”
investments. Second, interconnection investments are investments that must be made by an incumbent
grid owner to connect new generators with the rest of the network. These are often treated like radial links
and are typically paid for by the generators seeking interconnection. However, it is hard to draw bright
lines between reliability investments, interconnection investments, and investments that aﬀect network
congestion.
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lax contingency constraints, etc.). These are investments that are physically intertwined
with and inseparable from the incumbent TO’s facilities. These investments are speciﬁc
investments (as described by Williamson 1983) that we assume can be undertaken most
eﬃciently by the incumbent network owner. Similar to network deepening investments are
network maintenance decisions. Like network deepening, maintenance is most eﬃciently
performed by the owner of the link or grid.
Independent network expansion investments : These are investments that involve the con-
struction of separate new links (including parallel links) that are not physically intertwined
with the incumbent network except at the point at either end where they are intercon-
nected. These investments can (in principle) be made either by incumbent transmission
owners, by stakeholders (generators, load-serving entities), or by a third-party merchant
investor. The two operating DC merchant links in Australia appear to fall into this cat-
egory. However, as in Australia, these links may have eﬀects on power ﬂows on the rest
of the network, including on parallel lines, but are physically separable projects from a
construction and maintenance perspective.
Remark : The merchant investment paradigm requires that there eﬀectively be free entry
into the development of new transmission capacity. One can think of at least two situations
in which free entry is not a good assumption. First, network deepening investments can,
as a practical matter, only be implemented eﬃciently by the owner of the existing lines.
Deﬁning an eﬃcient “competitive access to deepening investments” policy is likely to be
extremely diﬃcult for several reasons. First, adding third-party facilities that are fully
integrated with the existing network from a physical and maintenance perspective creates
signiﬁcant incentive problems with decentralized ownership. The problems of deﬁning a
good set of rules for investing in and maintaining facilities of this type with decentralized
ownership is further exacerbated by the heterogeneous nature of transmission facilities.
While it is theoretically possible to devise contractual arrangements that will solve the
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incentive problems, including opportunistic behavior of one or more parties, investments
with these attributes are most likely to be governed eﬃciently through ownership by a
single ﬁrm ; second and relatedly, one would need to carefully allocate the new capacity of
the line between the initial design and maintenance choice of the original owner and the
actions of the renters who make deepening investments. This “moral hazard in teams”
problem is a substantial obstacle to the design of an eﬀective third party access policy for
this type of transmission investment.
This raises the question of how incumbent transmission owners are to participate in a
“market driven” transmission investment framework. On the one hand, precluding them
from participating would mean that potentially low-cost network deepening investments
will be lost. On the other hand, allowing them to make unregulated merchant investments
for network deepening enhancements to which they have unique access would allow them
to exercise market power, restrict supplies and capture rents that might otherwise go
to consumers under a regulated investment regime. It is natural then to think about
allowing incumbents to make regulated investments and new entrants make merchant
investments. However, to the extent that the regulated and merchant investments involve
parallel lines whether or not the most eﬃcient investments are made will depend heavily
on the regulatory mechanisms adopted. Mixing regulated and unregulated activities that
are (eﬀectively) in competition with one another is always a very challenging problem.
In Australia, this mixture of competition and regulation has led to extensive litigation
between proponents of regulated and merchant transmission links, delaying investments
in both.14
14Comments of Transgrid on Standard Market Design, FERC NOPR Proceeding, January 10, 2003.
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3 The case for merchant transmission investment
Let us start from the theoretical case for market driven or “merchant” transmission in-
vestment (this rationale has been developed, inter alia, by Hogan 1992 and Wu et al 1996,
Chao and Peck 1996 and examined further by Bushnell and Stoft 1996, 1997 for simple
cases.) The basic argument is conveyed in the two-node framework of ﬁgure 1.
North
South
K
K K Quantity
Price
Congestion Rents vs Congestion Costs
Net Supply in
North SN
Net Demand in
South DS
δK
C
B
ApS
pN
η {
No Congestion
Congestion Cost
Congestion Rent
Figure 1
Figure 1 depicts a simple situation in which load serving entities (distribution com-
panies or marketers buying on behalf of retail consumers, or large industrial customers
buying directly) in the South (say, a large city) buy their power from cheap generation
sources in the North and, possibly, more expensive sources in the South. Alas, the capac-
ity of the line from North to South is limited to K, and faced with net demand /supply
curves in the North and the South, the system operator is forced to dispatch “out of
merit”. For example, the system operator calls on expensive generators in the South
while generators in the North would be willing to supply this amount at a lower price
if more transmission capacity were available. The rationing of the scarce North-South
capacity is implemented by setting two nodal prices, pS and pN that clear the markets in
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the South and the North, respectively. The diﬀerence, η = pS − pN is the shadow price of
the transmission capacity constraint. The area ηK is the congestion rent and the triangle
ABC in the congestion or redispatch cost. The latter represents the cost of running more
costly generation in the South because less costly imports from the North are limited
by transmission congestion. The congestion rent and the congestion cost are sometimes
confused and it is important to recognize their appropriate deﬁnitions and meaning.
Now consider a marginal (unit) increase in transmission capacity (δK). This unit
increase allows one more KWh to ﬂow from North to South, replacing a marginal generator
in the South with cost pS by a cheaper generator in the North producing at cost pN . That
is, the social value of the investment is given by the reduction in the area ABC in Figure
1.
Assume that the builder of this marginal capacity, whether it is a new entrant or the
incumbent TO, is rewarded through a ﬁnancial transmission right that pays a dividend
equal to the shadow price of the transmission constraint. A non-incumbent merchant
company will enter to build this extra capacity as long as η exceeds the cost of building
it. By contrast, if an incumbent grid owner is compensated through the payment of
congestion rents, it may not want to make this marginal investment as it must compare
the extra revenue η net of the cost of expanding the capacity with the reduction in the
congestion rent on its inframarginal transmission units (−Kdη/dK). It is only when the
incumbent grid owner’s capacity has been rated at some level K∗ not too diﬀerent from
actual capacity, and that the corresponding rights, with value ηK∗, have been auctioned
oﬀ, that the monopoly distortion vanishes. The incremental capacity then yields η +
(K −K∗) dη
dK
close to η. As in the case of Contracts for Diﬀerences,15 forward sales
restore proper incentives for a player with market power.
Hogan (1992) and Bushnell and Stoft (1996, 1997) show that under certain condi-
15See Green (1999).
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tions (e.g. no increasing returns to scale, simultaneous feasibility constraints bind when
awarding congestion rights, eﬃcient nodal prices clear all markets, no market power in the
wholesale market, well deﬁned property rights, a complete set of competitive liquid for-
ward markets to provide suﬃcient statistics for long run demand and supply conditions
and risk management, etc.), all eﬃcient transmission investments will at least recover
their costs from congestion revenues and that ineﬃcient investments will not be prof-
itable. These are potentially powerful results that appear to transform the transmission
investment problem from one that appears to be almost intractable to one that requires
a simple implementation of a property-rights based market system.
Accordingly, merchant investment’s appeal is that it allows unfettered competition to
govern investment in new transmission capacity, placing the risks of investment ineﬃcien-
cies and cost overruns on investors rather than consumers, and bypassing planning and
regulatory issues associated with a structure that relies on regulated monopoly transmis-
sion companies. In addition, in theory, it allows investment in new generating capacity
in the constrained area to “compete” with new transmission investment that reduces the
import constraint. In this way, market driven transmission investment is an economist’s
dream, solving the problems associated with imperfect regulation of a “natural monopoly”
transmission company and aligning competitive transmission investments with the newly
developed competition in the generation segment. Unfortunately, the optimality of the
market driven approach depends on a number of strong assumptions and conditions that
are likely to be inconsistent with the actual attributes of transmission investments and the
operation of wholesale markets in practice. (some of the critiques will apply to alternative
frameworks as well).
We turn now to a discussion of what we view as the most important assumptions
underlying the case for the merchant model and the implications of relaxing these as-
sumptions. We will assume that wholesale markets are organized around the “nodal
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pricing” model utilized in PJM, New York and proposed in FERC’s SMD. We will ignore
issues associated with common ownership of generation and transmission and, following
the FERC SMD, assume that the TO and SO are independent. However, unlike much of
the analysis underlying this model we will recognize that the TO and SO have objective
functions, can make discretionary decisions that can aﬀect market performance, including
reliability risks, respond to incentives they face (including political pressures especially in
the case of non-proﬁt SOs), and that TO and SO decisions may be interdependent leading
to potential costs of imperfect coordination between them.
4 Imperfections in energy markets
The reasoning above assumes that the prices that clear the markets in the North and the
South reﬂect the marginal costs of production (and the marginal willingnesses to pay16)
at each location, so that the congestion rent perceived by merchant investors does reﬂect
the social savings brought about by the investment. That is, potential investors in new
transmission capacity see the correct locational price signals in the wholesale markets.
There are a number of reasons why this is unlikely to be the case. Market power may
distort nodal prices; regulatory interventions like price caps may distort prices; the absence
of a complete representation of consumer demand in the wholesale market may distort
prices; discretionary behavior by system operators may distort prices under “extreme”
conditions when the network is constrained.
Suppose for example that there is a generator with market power in the South, and
that the latter region is import constrained. The generator exercises market power by
withdrawing capacity and driving the price in the South up. Hence
pS > cS,
16We will present the argument in terms of cost savings; because what matters is net supply at each
node, the same argument would apply to the demand side.
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where cS denotes the marginal cost of production in the South. The measured congestion
rent then overestimates the cost savings associated with the replacement of one unit of
power generated in the South by one unit of power generated in the North, suggesting
an over-incentive to reinforce the link, ignoring the potential impacts of other market
imperfections.17 On the other hand, the increased transmission capacity does not replace
production in the South one-for-one; it also leads to an increase in total energy consump-
tion in the South, which yields a social beneﬁt equal to (pS − cS) times the expansion
in consumption. The box below shows that, under a very weak assumption,18 the ﬁrst
eﬀect dominates, and therefore market power results in an over-incentive to invest in
merchant transmission. Similarly, and to the extent that reinforcing the line is akin to
adding production capacity in the South, this suggests that entrants in generation have
too much of an incentive to invest in the South as well. The box veriﬁes that this is
indeed the case. Thus, market power in the importing area does not reduce incentives
to invest in additional transmission capacity between the exporting and importing areas.
Other things equal, market power in the importing area produces enhanced incentives for
transmission investment.
The impact of locational market power on merchant investment incentives
• Consider a monopoly supplier in the South producing at marginal cost cS and facing
demand function D(pS). Provided that the transmission capacity K between North
and South is fully utilized, the monopolist solves:
max
pS
{(pS − cS) [D (pS)−K]} ;
equivalently, this monopolist selects a consumption qS in the South so as to solve :
17For example, as we discuss below, lumpiness in transmission investment leads to under-investment.
18The assumption is that the Southern monopolist’s reaction curve be downward sloping in a Cournot
game. Intuitively, the transmission line creates a Cournot “duopoly” in the South, in which the Southern
ﬁrm faces a ﬁxed output from its (transmission) rival. A downward sloping reaction curve means that
the Southern ﬁrm curtails its output as the transmission capacity expands. This implies that the energy
consumption increase eﬀect is smaller than the inﬂated signal eﬀect (the two eﬀects would cancel if the
output in the South were invariant to an increase in imports from the North).
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max
qS
{[P (qS)− cS] (qS −K)} ,
where P (·) denotes the inverse demand function and Sg(·) the gross surplus. Neglecting
consumption in the North, social surplus is
W = Sg (qS)− cNK − cS [qS −K] .
The marginal gross surplus, dSg/dqS is equal to price pS in the South, and so when
the line’s capacity is increased by dK, resulting in a consumption change dqS, welfare
changes by
dW = (pS − cS) dqS + (cS − cN) dK.
Note that, with perfect competition, pS = cS (and pN = cN) and so dW = ηdK.
With monopoly power in the South, though,
pS − cS > 0
and
cS − cN < η.
There is an over-incentive to invest if and only if
dW < ηdK,
and
(pS − cS) dqS + (cS − cN) dK < (pS − cN) dK,
that is if and only if
dqS < dK,
For there to be an over-incentive to invest, the monopolist must “absorb” some of the
increase in imports from the North. To know whether this is the case, diﬀerentiate the
ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization:
dqS
dK
=
P ′
2P ′ + (qS −K)P ′′ .
Thus, there is an over-incentive to invest under merchant investment if and only if
P ′ + (qS −K)P ′′ < 0.
A suﬃcient condition for this is that the demand curve be concave. More generally,
this condition is the standard condition for quantities to be strategic substitutes.
• The same reasoning can be applied to generation investments in the South. Indeed,
K could alternatively denote the amount of power produced by a competitive fringe in
the South in the proﬁt maximization exercise. And so
dqS < dK
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as long as
P ′ + (qS −K)P ′′ < 0.
There is an over-incentive to invest if and only if
dW − (pS − cS) dK < 0
or
d [Sn (qS)− cSqS] < (pS − cS) dK
⇐⇒ (pS − cS) (dK − dqS) > 0.
Hence, there is in general an over-incentive to invest in generation in the South as well.
Conversely, a generator with market power in the North may (while still making full
use of the link) be able to raise price pN by withdrawing production capacity — perhaps to
the level of pS if it faces no competition in the North (Oren, 1997; Stoft, 1999; Joskow and
Tirole 2000). In this case, the congestion rent underestimates the gain from expanding
the line’s capacity, resulting in an under-investment by merchant transmission investors.
At the same time, it could lead to ineﬃcient entry of generating capacity in the North in
response to the short run monopoly rents created there.
As a second example, in the case of market power in the South (this is the situation
that will generate very high prices for consumers in the South), the regulator may be
tempted to impose a price cap.19 While the price cap improves economic eﬃciency if it
really is about constraining market power, it may also distort price signals if high prices
are at least sometimes due to tight competitive supply and demand conditions rather than
market power. A cap pS ≤ p¯S then reduces the congestion rents during those hours that
are very important because they produce the bulk of the rents to support investment,
yielding under-investment in transmission.
Third, prices may not clear supply and demand in real time because market clearing
processes are not fast enough to respond to rapid changes in supply and demand condi-
19Or a de facto price cap as when the system operator curtails load administratively when prices don’t
clear the market.
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tions while maintaining physical requirements for frequency, voltage, and stability on the
network. To maintain physical network parameters, administrative rationing is then sub-
stituted for prices to balance supply and demand as a consequence of what is eﬀectively
a problem of incomplete markets (Wilson 2002). Moreover, the system operator has dis-
cretion in determining the exact nature of the responses to operating reserve deﬁciencies
or “scarcity.” For example, Patton (2002) shows that during tight supply conditions the
system operator takes actions that tend to depress market-clearing prices. Whether it is
administrative rationing in response to incomplete markets or price controls motivated by
eﬀorts to constraint market power or price distortions caused by market power or discre-
tionary decisions by the system operator, actual prices will depart from the eﬃcient prices
required to give the eﬃcient signals for new investment. These imperfections are poten-
tially important with regard to transmission (and generation) investment because the
prices that create signiﬁcant congestion rents tend to occur in a relatively small number
of hours and these hours also happen to be the hours when these types of price distortions
are most likely to occur.
5 Lumpy transmission investments
The analysis of the eﬀects of market power in investment incentives in the previous section,
as well as most of the literature upon which the merchant investment model relies, assumes
that transmission investment is not characterized by economies of scale or “lumpiness”.
However, network expansion investments are likely to be lumpy. That is, the average cost
of a new link declines as its capacity increases, other things equal (Baldick and Kahn 1992,
Perez-Arriaga et al, 1999). (Many network deepening investments may be less lumpy, but
as we have already discussed, these investments are most conducive to investment by
the incumbent network owner rather than a merchant entrant. We discuss deepening
investments further below.) The impact of lumpiness is illustrated in ﬁgure 2. The initial
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capacity is K0 and economically can be brought to a level K1.
K0 K1
η0 η1
Net supply in
the North
Net demand
in the South
surplus S1
Figure 2
Assuming that the energy market participants are perfectly competitive, so that net
demand/supply curves represent the true marginal costs/willingnesses to pay, and the
market is cleared by eﬃcient nodal prices, the surplus created (or congestion cost reduced)
by the expansion of capacity from K0 to K1 is depicted by the shaded area in ﬁgure
2. The value, η1 (K1 −K0) of the transmission rights (equal to the ex post congestion
rents) granted to the merchant investors building this capacity expansion understate the
social surplus S1 it creates by reducing congestion costs. Lumpiness thus results in an
underincentive to reinforce the system for the same reason that an incumbent grid owner
rewarded by congestion rents has suboptimal incentives to remove these congestion rents.20
Another source of lumpiness for network expansion investments arises because there
may be a scarcity of rights of way, for example a unique corridor between a cheap and an
expensive area. The diﬃculties that new transmission corridors face in obtaining siting
authority suggests that the available corridors for new lines through many areas will be
limited in the sense that (for example) one additional corridor may be available through
the Pyrenees between France and Spain, and it may accommodate one new link that could
20The underincentive eﬀect associated with lumpiness is also discussed by Gans and King (2000).
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be of any size between 100 MW and 1000 MW. This scarcity is particularly problematic
as demand grows. Merchant investment is then likely to end up in a “preemption and
monopoly” situation. A merchant will install a small capacity on the corridor to gain a
toehold and will later expand this capacity (presumably, the merchant will underinvest
in this expansion as we have seen), to the extent that the expansions are now deepening
investments. To be certain, under perfect competition, rents will be dissipated through a
very early entry into the scarce corridor, or, if the corridor is put up for auction, through
high bids. But the outcome is then similar to a monopoly outcome. Moreover, scarce
corridors are typically not allocated through auctions but rather through a regulatory
process that places a premium on being ﬁrst in line.
Besides generating too little investment, lumpiness also may make merchant invest-
ment occur too early when it takes place in order to pre-empt additional entry. In a system
with growing demand, pre-emption leads to an investment at the ﬁrst date at which the
discounted value of the ﬁnancial rights on the additional capacity is equal to the invest-
ment cost. It could also lead to the investment being “undersized”. For example, if the
optimal investment is 600 MW, a merchant developer may ﬁnd it most proﬁtable to invest
in a 300 MW enhancement, pre-empting additional investment. The box below contains
an analysis of the incentive to get a toehold by sinking a small investment to pre-empt
additional entry and produce monopoly rents for the merchant transmission investor and
under-investment in transmission capacity, generally.
Lumpy investments: preemption and toeholds
• Suppose that at some future date T , the net demand in the South jumps up to a new
level (the dotted line in ﬁgure 3); the post-reinforcement shadow price jumps from η1
to η2 > η1. Letting r denote the interest rate and I the investment cost, suppose that
η1 (K1 −K0) < rI < η2 (K1 −K0) .
Then, under free entry into merchant transmission investment, investment occurs at
date τ < T such that
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[
1− e−r(T−τ)
r
η1 +
e−r(T−τ)
r
η2
]
(K1 −K0) = I.
Note that this preemption is actually socially beneﬁcial if the surplus S1 brought about
by the expansion before the increase in demand exceeds the interest on the investment
cost, i.e.:
S1 > rI.
Otherwise, preemption is socially wasteful.
And the point about underinvestment remains: Letting S2 denote the surplus after
demand has grown, if
η2 (K1 −K0) < rI < S2,
then no merchant investment ever takes place even though it is socially desirable.
• Similarly, we can show that preemption may encourage ineﬃciently small investments.
Suppose that capacity K1 can either be reached in one stage, at cost I, as discussed
above, or in two stages. We assume that the second-stage upgrade can be performed
only by the ﬁrst-stage merchant investor: see the ﬁnal remark below. The ﬁrst stage
costs I ′ and yields capacity K ′, K0 < K ′ < K1, which can then be upgraded at cost I ′′
to K1.
Let η′∈ (η1 , η2) denote the congestion cost for capacity K ′ before demand in the South
jumps up. Similarly, let η′2 denote the shadow price after T when transmission capacity
is K ′. See ﬁgure 3. The ﬁrst-stage merchant investor has an incentive to upgrade the
facility at date T to yield total capacity K1 if and only if
η2
(K1 −K0)
r
− I ′′ > η′2
(K ′ −K0)
r
,
which we will assume. Let us look for an equilibrium in which a merchant investor
preempts at date τ < T by investing a little (I ′ ) and then upgrades the line at time
T :
I ′ =
1− e−r(T−τ)
r
η′ (K ′ −K0) + e−r(T−τ)
[
η2 (K1 −K0)
r
− I ′′
]
.
For this, it must be the case that preemption at (τ − ε) with the full investment does
not pay oﬀ:
I ≥
[
1− e−r(T−τ)
r
η1 +
e−r(T−τ)
r
η2
]
(K1 −K0) ,
or
I − [I ′ + e−r(T−τ)I ′′] ≥ 1− e−r(T−τ)
r
[η1 (K1 −K0)− η′ (K ′ −K0)] .
The right-hand side of this inequality is negative if the total value of the rights (the
total congestion rent) decreases with the capacity of the link.
Aside from the timing considerations discussed above, note that given an entry at τ ,
a social planner might want to jump to capacity K1 directly, as the social surplus is
larger under capacity K1 than under capacity K
′. Note also that if the “upgrade”
24
from K ′ to K2 can be made by another investor than the ﬁrst-stage merchant investor,
the latter will need to perform the upgrade before T (that is, preemption occurs at
both stages). The reason for this is that the upgrade reduces the ﬁrst-stage investor’s
inframarginal rents (the rent on the (K ′ −K0) units of capacity), while entrants have
no such rent).
K0 K ′ K1
η0
η′2{}η′ η1{ } η2 Net supply inthe North
Expanded net demand in
the South (after date T )
Net demand
in the South
(before date
T )
Figure 3
6 State-contingent rights and diversiﬁcation
The analysis of merchant investment assumes that the capacities K0 and K1 are well-
deﬁned and non-stochastic. This abstracts from some important issues that arise even in
the two-node case, but are especially problematic in more complex networks with loop
ﬂow, which we discuss in a separate section below. In practice, even in the two-node
model, the actual capacity of the North/South link depends on exogenous environmental
parameters; furthermore, system operators have substantial discretion on deﬁning and
implementing security constraints, aﬀecting the actual power ﬂows on the link in real
time. For example, the physical capability of transmission lines depends on temperature
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and other exogenous contingencies.21 And, of course, even a well-maintained system will
have some random outages that cause the available capacity of the link to be reduced.
Moreover, the ex ante estimated physical capabilities of a transmission network are deﬁned
by relatively crude administrative risk criteria (N-1, N-2) and a set of assumed system
“study” conditions that are discretionary decisions of the system operator that could
change in the future. In addition, the eﬀective transmission capacity of the network
varies dynamically from the study condition assumptions as system conditions change.
This all raises the issue of the number of ﬁnancial rights to be allocated for the existing
system and as a consequence of new investments, how congestion revenue deﬁciencies or
surpluses arising from deviations between the number of rights allocated ex ante and
the actual capacity of the network ex post are handled, and how these allocation and
compensation decisions aﬀect investment and the ultimate performance of the system.
We consider this issue in the simple two-node case and explore the issue further when we
consider loop ﬂow below.
Suppose that K is stochastic: K = K(θ), K ′(θ) > 0 and θ is distributed between θ−
and θ+. Let’s say that the line is congested for all values of θ, but the value of η will vary
with K(θ). For which value of θ should one compute the number of ﬁnancial rights? One
could be conservative and set the number of ﬁnancial rights equal to K(θ−). One would
issue K(θ−) ﬁnancial rights and owe the holders ηK(θ−) in congestion payments. When
the realized θ is θ−, one satisﬁes the feasibility and revenue adequacy condition. But what
happens when θ > θ−? The merchandising surplus will exceed what is owed to the rights
21The rated capacity of Path 15, connecting Northern and Southern California falls by about 600 MW
as the ambient temperature rises, other things equal. The rated capacity of Path 15 varies by about
1300 MW depending on the availability of various remedial action schemes to respond to transmission
and certain generation outages. California ISO, Operating Procedure T-122A, November 6, 2002. It is
also important to recognize that in the U.S. and Europe there is not a single SO controlling the network,
but multiple SOs controlling independent segments of the network. To maintain reliability and avoid
free riding less ﬂexible contingency criteria must be deﬁned than might be the case if there were a single
SO operating the network in real time. For example, the simultaneous import transmission capacity into
Southern California varies by 700MW depending on the operating status of the three units of a nuclear
generating plant in Arizona. California ISO, Operating Procedure T-103, November 6, 2002.
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holders. What does one do with the excess and how does the distribution aﬀect investment
incentives? At the other extreme, one could set the number of ﬁnancial rights to reﬂect the
maximum capacity K(θ+). There would be revenue adequacy when θ = θ+ but not when
θ < θ+, which would be most of the time since the system operator would owe ηK(θ+)
regardless of the actual realization of θ. Where does the shortfall come from and how
does it aﬀect investment incentives? The answers to these questions necessarily aﬀect the
incentives merchant investors will have to make transmission investments. Realistically,
especially at this stage of the development of a competitive wholesale electricity markets,
SO discretion, as it aﬀects the number and value of transmission rights and uncertain
rules for implementing feasibility standards and deﬁning the number of rights introduce
uncertainties and potential opportunism problems that are not present for typical property
rights.
The impact of a generous (K(θ+), say) or conservative (K(θ−), say) distribution of
rights on investment incentives depends on the way the resulting shortfall or surplus is
ﬁnanced or redistributed. Suppose, ﬁrst, that one appeals to the taxpayer. Even if tax-
ation were lump-sum, there would still be distortions in investment behavior; generous
distributions over-incentivize merchants, while conservative ones under-incentivize them.
By contrast, appropriate taxes on users of the transmission network22 make biased dis-
tributions of rights neutral in this radial network, provided that the dispatch is eﬃcient:
An eﬃcient dispatch implies that in each state of nature, the cum-tax (or subsidy) price
at a given node fully utilizes the link. And so end-users are unaﬀected by a generous
or conservative distribution of rights on the line. Because there is no source or sink of
money outside of the industry, rights owners receive the same overall dividend (for ex-
ample, through a smaller per-unit dividend in the case of a generous distribution). This
22We here have in mind proportional taxes on electricity in the South (so the price is pS +τS , where pS
is the nodal price in the South) and a tax on exports from the North (where generators receive pN − τN ).
When actual capacity (Ka) is larger than the number of rights K, this eﬀectively reduces the net dividend
paid to rights holders so that there is suﬃcient revenue to compensate them.
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taxation solution is however complex, since the taxes have to be state contingent. One
might therefore as well have state contingent rights.
The basic problem here is that the non-contingent property rights that have been used
in the literature are not well matched to the stochastic and dynamic physical attributes of
transmission networks. At the very least, a merchant framework requires diﬀerent types
of property rights.
For example, rather than dealing with the payment shortfall or surplus problems
associated with the kinds of property rights that have been proposed, it seems more
natural simply to divide the merchandizing surplus proportionately among the rights’
owners based on their relative ownership shares. The next box analyzes the optimal
relative allocation rule (in the same way percentage ownership, but not the total number of
shares, matters to determine one’s proceeds from the distribution of a ﬁrm’s dividend, the
exact number of rights does not matter as long as the merchandizing surplus is distributed
proportionately among rights’ owners). It shows that the optimal allocation rule derives
from standard asset pricing (CAPM) principles in ﬁnance. An addition to an existing link
is particularly valuable if its actual capacity remains high when the primary link is very
congested. Its construction then creates a diversiﬁcation beneﬁt. These diversiﬁcation
beneﬁts are ignored both in the traditional deﬁnition of ﬁxed MW point-to-point property
rights payment obligations and with a simple proportional allocation rule.
For example, suppose that the primary North-South AC line exhibits reduced capacity
(or breakdowns) during very hot weather. Then an addition along the same path has less
social value if it is an aerial AC line than if it is an underground DC line not subject
to the same climatic shocks even if average line availability is the same for both. Allo-
cations of rights based only on expected link capacity therefore miss the point that, for
a given capacity, some lines may provide better insurance than others. More generally,
an allocation of rights solely in proportion to (or equal to) expected capacities provides
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insuﬃcient incentives to build lines whose availability covaries with the shadow price less
(in absolute value) than that of the existing lines. (This point applies to the case of
networks with loop ﬂow discussed further below. That is, if a transmission investment
has a diversiﬁcation beneﬁt, it must be reﬂected in the allocation of rights if the rights
are relied upon to stimulate eﬃcient transmission investments.)
Non-contingent ﬁnancial rights under state-contingent capacities.
Consider the North-South network described at the beginning of the section (see ﬁgure
1). The initial expected capacity of the link is K (the actual capacity will in a moment
be assumed to be state-contingent). A merchant investor contemplates adding a small
amount δK of expected capacity to the line.
Actual dispatching depends on the realization of the state of the world ω. The state
of the world encompasses the uncertainty about net demand in the South, DS (pS, ω),
that about net supply in the North, SN (pN , ω), and the actual capacity of the lines:
[1 + θ(ω)]K for the existing link(s)
and
[1 + µ(ω)] δK for the new facility,
where we can normalize the noises to have zero means
E [θ(ω)] = E [µ(ω)] = 0.
Let us assume that the SO dispatches optimally given the state of nature; and so, in
states of nature in which the North-South link is congested:
DS (pS(ω), ω) = SN (pN(ω), ω) = [1 + θ(ω)]K + [1 + µ(ω)] δK.
Let η(ω) ≡ pS(ω)− pN(ω) denote the (state-contingent) shadow price of the link.
Suppose further that K∗ rights are distributed among all rights owners, including the
merchant investor, and that the distribution is proportional to average capacities; and
so the merchant investor receives
δK
K + δK
K∗ rights.
The merchandizing surplus is distributed to rights owners. Needless to say, distribu-
tions of rights that would not reﬂect expected capacities could by themselves introduce
a bias in merchant investors’ incentives. For example, suppose that the incumbents in
the past received a very generous rating of the existing lines form North to South, while
rating standards are strengthened for new comers. The latter then receive a dispro-
portionately small share of total rights, which penalizes them when the merchandizing
surplus is distributed among rights’ owners, and thereby gives little incentive to sink
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new investment. To avoid such obvious biases, we assume an allocation of rights
proportional to average capacity. Even so, merchant incentives may be inappropriate,
as we will see shortly.
The congestion dividend, d(ω) paid to the owner of a right is therefore:
K∗d(ω) = [[1 + θ(ω)]K + [1 + µ(ω)] δK] η(ω).
The merchant investor’s expected revenue, R, is therefore
R = E
[(
δK
K + δK
K∗
)
d(ω)
]
= (δK)Eω
[
[1 + θ(ω)]K + [1 + µ(ω)] δK
K + δK
η(ω)
]
 (δK)Eω [[1 + θ(ω)] η(ω)]
for δK small.
By contrast, the increase in social welfare is
δW  (δK)Eω [[1 + µ(ω)] η(ω)] ,
Since in state ω, the merchant investor’s expansion delivers [1 + µ(ω)] δK units of
transmission capacity which each have value η(ω).
Hence,
R ≤ δW ⇐⇒ cov(µ, η) ≥ cov(θ, η).
Let us draw the implications of this simple characterization in speciﬁc environments:
Example 1 (diversiﬁcation eﬀect). Suppose that all uncertainty results from line avail-
ability. Existing line(s) may exhibit reduced capacity due to harsh weather (extreme
heat) conditions. The merchant investor’s line, by contrast is not (or at least less)
subject to these harsh weather conditions (or is better protected against them). For
example, the new line could be underground, or cross a climatically distinct area. Then
θ(ω) and η(ω) are (in a ﬁrst approximation) perfectly negatively correlated, while η is
not perfectly correlated with θ:
µ = kθ + ε
with
k < 1 and E(ε | θ) = 0.
Hence:
cov(µ, η) ≥ cov(θ, η),
implying
R < δW.
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Non-contingent rights create an under-incentive to invest. Intuitively, the new line
supplies a disproportionately high share of the transmission capacity in those states
of nature in which transmission capacity is scarce and therefore very valuable. This
contribution however is not reﬂected in the distribution of dividends which is based on
ﬁxed (non state-contingent) shares. It is only when the availabilities of the lines (old
and new) are perfectly correlated that the private and social incentives coincide.
The analysis can be generalized to encompass uncertainty about energy market par-
ticipants’s demand and supply curves. Suppose that
SN = aN + bNpN + εN
DS = aS − bSpS + εS.
So ω = (θ, µ, εN , εS). Under eﬃcient dispatching
η(ω) 
[
aS
bS
+
aN
bN
]
+
[
εS
bS
+
εN
bN
]
−
[
1
bS
+
1
bN
]
K(1 + θ).
This implies that the analysis above generalizes when line availabilities are independent
of demand and supply shocks (cov (εi, θ) = cov (εi , µ) = 0 for i = N,S).
On the other hand, line availability may be related to demand and supply shocks. For
example, it may be that a line (old or new) is subject to the same climatic shock as the
demand node. Hot weather may simultaneously increase demand and limit the capacity
of the line bringing electricity from a cheaper node (precisely when the line is most
needed). Such a line obviously has a lower social worth than one whose availability is
less negatively correlated with increases in demand at the expensive node.
Example 2 (uncertainty about energy market players only). Suppose that there is no
uncertainty about the actual capacities of the lines:
θ(ω) = η(ω) = 0 for all ω.
Hence all uncertainty comes from generation and consumption. In this case, the private
and social incentives coincide:
R = δW.
To sum up, the analysis in this section leads to several conclusions. The type of
non-contingent transmission rights that have been contemplated in the literature are not
well adapted to the physical attributes of transmission investment. Both the quantities
of non-contingent rights awarded and the distributions of congestion revenue surpluses
and shortfalls are in some sense arbitrary as a result. But these decisions also necessarily
aﬀect investment incentives. Rights whose capacities are contingent on exogenous factors
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that change the capacity of the network are conceptually a superior approach to deﬁning
transmission rights. On a two-node network, transmission rights that give the holders
the rights to a proportionate share of the congestion revenues in each (exogenous) state
of nature replicate the type of contingent right that we have in mind and do not create
market liquidity problems. As we shall see below, however, there is no equivalent to
simple proportional rights for creating the desired contingent rights on a network with
loop ﬂow. Finally, regardless of the types of rights oﬀered, the quantity of rights given
to investors in new transmission capacity should reﬂect the insurance attributes of the
new links based on the covariance between the actual varying of these links over time,
reﬂecting outages and deratings, and the actual varying capacity of the existing links.
7 Nominal and actual transmission capacity
The diﬃculty in putting a number in front of a line’s “capacity” (in the two-node case)
raises other issues. In a nutshell, the actual capacity of the line depends on discretionary
choices, and under a merchant transmission model control is likely to be separated from
ownership due to the conﬂict of interest associated with the measurement of congestion
rents. This section considers two such discretionary actions: dispatching and maintenance.
7.1 Dispatching
As we already noted, rewarding merchant investment through congestion rents requires
separating ownership and dispatch in order to obtain an unbiased measure of this rent.
But this separation of ownership and dispatch raises a moral-hazard-in-teams problem.
The electric system’s state-contingent output (to simplify, the intensity of power in the
absence of outage and the probability and duration of an outage) depends on both the
care and the forecasts of the owner (the quality of the line, its maintenance, and the
adequacy to consumers’ needs) and the quality of the management of the grid by the
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system operator, as the latter must use her acumen to get lots of power through without
creating a high risk of outage.
In other words, the transmission owner’s measure of performance is conditioned by the
system operator’s behavior and therefore incentive scheme. This raises two points: First,
one cannot consider incentives given to merchant investors without also specifying those
of the system operator. Second, moral hazard in teams reduces accountability. An outage
can be claimed to result from poor line maintenance or from imprudent dispatching.
Conversely, high power prices may be due to a proper dispatching motivated by low line
quality or to an undue conservatism of the system operator.
There is also a potential moral-hazard-in-teams problem among line owners. Recall
that merchant investment incentives are better aligned with the public interest when
merchants don’t have inframarginal units whose congestion rent is to be preserved. The
total North-South capacity may then belong to diﬀerent owners. The same value of a
given actual capacity K selected by the independent system operator may correspond to
diﬀerent quality conﬁgurations of the various components of the network with multiple
owners. The question is then one of allocation of total capacity and congestion rents
among the diﬀerent owners.
Moral hazard in teams : transmission owners and system operator
Consider the North-South network. Let K denote the nominal capacity of the line. In
a ﬁrst step, we assume that this capacity is known to the system operator (for example,
the line’s maintenance is perfectly observed by the SO). The system operator choose
to allow an amount K̂ to ﬂow through the link. The greater is K̂, the higher is the
probability that the link breaks down. We assume that with probability x
(
K̂ −K
)
the link breaks down and no power ﬂows through it. With probability 1−x
(
K̂ −K
)
,
K̂ ﬂows through. The function x is increasing in K̂. Let L
(
K̂
)
denote the out-of-merit
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dispatch cost when the realized capacity of the line is K̂. [For example, in ﬁgure 1, L
was equal to the area of the triangle ABC (for capacity K)]. We assume that there
is no market power at either mode and so L represents the social loss attached to the
inability to import power without constraint from the North. Note that
L′ = −η.
The socially optimal dispatch solves, for a given K,
min
K̂
{
x
(
K̂ −K
)
L(0) +
[
1− x
(
K̂ −K
)]
L
(
K̂
)}
.
And so K̂ = K̂∗ is given by
x′
(
K̂∗ −K
) [
L(0)− L
(
K̂∗
)]
+
[
1− x
(
K̂∗ −K
)]
L′
(
K̂∗
)
= 0.
The marginal social gain from capacity expansion is then (using the envelope theorem):
dW
dK
= x′ [L(0)− L(K)] = (1− x)η.
And so, if the marginal investment is rewarded by the congestion cost in the absence
of outages, merchant investors face the proper signal for investment.
• Dispatcher with conservative incentives.
Turn now to the system operator’s incentives. Suppose that the SO is penalized more
for outages than she is rewarded for increases in the amount of power ﬂowing through
the network ; that is, she solves:
min
K̂
{
x
(
K̂ −K
)
θL(0) +
[
1− x
(
K̂ −K
)]
L
(
K̂
)}
,
where θ > 1. This yields ﬁrst-order condition:
x′
[
θL(0)− L
(
K̂
)]
+ [1− x]L′
(
K̂
)
= 0.
The marginal social gain from capacity expansion is
dW
dK
= x′
[
L(0)− L
(
K̂
)]
− x′(1− θ)L(0)dK̂
dK
.
And so
dW
dK
− (1− x)η = x′(1− θ)L(0)
[
1− dK̂
dK
]
,
using the SO’s ﬁrst-order condition.
Next, rewrite the SO’s optimization program as the choice of a risk factor ∆ ≡ K̂−K:
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min
K̂
{x (∆) θL(0) + [1− x (∆)]L (K + ∆)} .
The cross-partial derivative of the minimand with respect to K and ∆ is positive as
L′′ > 0, and so, by a revealed preference argument, ∆ is decreasing in K, or:
dK̂
dK
< 1.
In words, the system operator takes less risk as K increases, because the marginal gain
from increased throughﬂow decreases. We therefore conclude that
dW
dK
< (1− x)η,
and so congestion rent payments over-incentivize merchant investors. In a sense, the
SO’s conservative behavior implies that insuﬃcient use will be made of the added
capacity and so the shadow price of the link overstates the value of additional capacity.
This result shows that one cannot properly analyze merchant investment (or, for that
matter, the incentives of a Tranco company not responsible for dispatching) without
considering the system operator’s incentives.
Moral hazard in teams : general considerations
At an abstract level, one can view transmission owners and the SO as a team (in the
sense of Holmstro¨m 1982) jointly delivering an output — state-contingent power— to
the ﬁnal consumers. A general principle is that proper incentives require that each
member of the team be made the residual claimant for the team performance. So for
example each member of a n-member team should receive 1 when the team’s proﬁt in-
creases by 1 (third parties must act as “budget breakers” to bring the missing $(n− 1)).
Here, the performance of the team is not a proﬁt, but rather (minus) the social loss
xL(0) + [1− x]L
(
K̂
)
,
and the members of the team are the SO and the transmission owners. Making each
residual claimant is however very costly for two reasons:
• Adverse selection : fortuitous improvements in performance give rise to n rents.
• Collusion : relatedly, the members of the team have an incentive to collude.
Suppose for example that a merchant investor has a marginal project that costs
as much as the marginal reduction of redispatching cost it brings about. While
this merchant investor is indiﬀerent as to whether to implement the project, the
other participants (SO, other transmission owners) each costlessly receive the
value of this reduction in redispatching cost if he implements it. They therefore
have incentives to bribe him into investing. More generally, collusion will induce
investments whose cost vastly exceed their social beneﬁt.
To avoid or alleviate these problems, one can make each member accountable for only
a fraction of the social beneﬁt. But this policy creates moral hazard. For example,
transmission owners have reduced incentives for maintenance.
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7.2 Maintenance
It is now well understood that an owner of physical transmission rights may have an
incentive to withdraw some of the physical capacity in order to create artiﬁcial scarcity
and thereby raise the value of the rights. Overt withdrawals can of course be prevented
through a use-it-or-lose-it rule, but withdrawals can take more subtle forms. For instance,
maintenance can be strategically planned so as to occur during tight supply periods.
Similar concerns arise in the case of ﬁnancial rights. Consider a merchant investor
who is in charge of the maintenance (to create more accountability at the building stage)
and keeps the ﬁnancial rights. Then, planning the maintenance in high-congestion pe-
riods raises the price of the rights in these periods and may raise the owner’s revenue.
This suggests that it might be desirable to require merchant investors to sell their rights
to third parties along with a performance-based contract that provides incentives for the
transmission owner to make eﬃcient maintenance decisions. Namely, the merchant in-
vestor will be held liable for revenue shortfalls that his choice of maintenance schedule
and technique imposes on the owners of acquired rights.
The box below analyzes the merchant investor’s maintenance choices in the absence
and presence of such liability assuming that capacity availability depends only on the
transmission owner’s maintenance practices. (Of course in reality other factors that af-
fect transmission capacity that are not under the control of the owner would have to
be controlled for.) The performance contract induces the merchant investor to “with-
draw” less capacity for maintenance purposes and to use more expensive methods (such
as helicopter-based live maintenance) during peak periods, but it induces excess line avail-
ability and expenditure during these periods. This overshooting comes from the fact that
the accountability for revenue shortfalls makes the merchant investor a net buyer of rights.
36
Financial rights and incentives for maintenance
Suppose that there are t = 1, · · · , T subperiods, with varying degrees of congestion. Let
Et denote the maintenance expenditure and kt the capacity made available in period
t. The merchant owner chooses expenditures Et and availabilities kt ≤ K, the rated
capacity, so as to maximize
T∑
t=1
[ktηt − Et] .
Letting wt ≡ K − kt denote the capacity withdrawn for maintenance, the period-t
contribution to maintenance is
mt = f (wt, Et) (1)
and is increasing in its two arguments. In a sense, money and unavailability are sub-
stitutes in maintenance production. For example, the owner can use helicopters to
maintain while letting lines operate (“live maintenance”). An adequate level of main-
tenance is obtained when
M (m1, · · · ,mT ) ≥ M, (2)
where M is increasing in its arguments. The socially optimal levels of expenditure and
maintenance satisfy, for all t:
ηt = µ
∂M
∂mt
∂f
∂wt
, (3)
1 = µ
∂M
∂mt
∂f
∂Et
, (4)
where µ is the multiplier of the maintenance adequacy constraint (2).
A proﬁt-maximizing owner yields (4) and
ηt − kt ∂ηt
∂wt
= µ
∂M
∂mt
∂f
∂wt
. (5)
The marginal revenue loss of withdrawing capacity is (unless kt is small) smaller than
is socially optimal, since this creates additional scarcity (∂ηt/∂wt > 0) when the line
is congested. Note that
∂f
∂wt
∂f
∂Et
< ηt
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in congested periods. That is, the merchant investor overconsumes line unavailability
relative to expenditures during peak periods.
Suppose now that,
• the merchant investor sells the K ﬁnancial rights, and
• he operates the link’s maintenance subject to a performance-based scheme making
him accountable for the revenue shortfall.
The merchant investor then receives a ﬁxed revenue for the ﬁnancial rights and then
selects his maintenance strategy so as to solve:
min
{wt,Et}
{
T∑
t=1
[(K − kt) ηt + Et]
}
subject to (1) and (2). The ﬁrst-order conditions are (4) and
ηt + (K − kt) ∂ηt
∂wt
= µ
∂M
∂mt
∂f
∂wt
. (6)
And so
∂f
∂wt
∂f
∂Et
> ηt
in congested periods.
The merchant investor, who has sold K rights forward, has become a net buyer of
rights. He therefore has an incentive to excessively enhance availability (underschedule
maintenance) during congested periods so as to reduce the penalty paid for unavail-
ability. The merchant investor also tends to substitute expenditures (live maintenance
for instance) for withdrawals of capacity during peak time. While this clearly is a good
thing qualitatively, there is some overshooting as the merchant investor now beneﬁts
from lowering the value of the rights.
Policymakers are sometimes attracted to the merchant investment model because
they think that it relieves them of the diﬃcult task of designing and implementing good
incentive regulation mechanisms. This discussion should make it clear that this view is
misguided. The system operator remains a monopoly and providing it with appropri-
ate incentives continues to be an important regulatory policy challenge. Allowing (or
requiring) merchant investors to sell ﬁnancial transmission rights without performance
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contracts can distort maintenance behavior. Regulatory rules may be necessary to obtain
the best design for such performance contracts. And, of course, if the incumbent trans-
mission owners continue to be regulated, incentive issues regarding both maintenance and
investment continue to be of great importance.
8 Deﬁning and allocating rights with loop ﬂows
Loop ﬂow introduces additional practical complications. First, how does one deﬁne the
“capacity” created by new investment and the associated ﬁnancial rights that go along
with the new capacity on a network with three or more nodes and associated loop ﬂows?
Second, full or partial outages of one link may aﬀect the eﬀective capacity and nodal
prices on other links and at other nodes in less straightforward ways than in the two-node
case, especially when there are multiple owners.23 And as is now well-known, an addition
of capacity may have negative social value and even in the absence of system operator
discretion, the increase in a link’s capacity is unrelated to the system’s increased capacity.
Finally, and more crucially, small investments may no longer be “marginal”.
With a two-node network or a radial network with multiple generation nodes but
without loop ﬂow, transmission rights (whether physical or ﬁnancial) are naturally con-
ceptualised as “link-based” rights reﬂecting the capacity of each link. When there are
more than two nodes and loop ﬂow, then there are at least two ways of introducing ﬁnan-
cial rights (Joskow and Tirole 2000, pp. 478–479). One approach is to use “link-based”
rights (Oren et. al. 1995) which are rights associated with each transmission line on
the network and, in the case of ﬁnancial rights, paying a dividend equal to the shadow
price of the congestion on each line. The other approach proposed by Hogan (1992) is to
specify point-to-point ﬁnancial rights from each injection node to each receipt node on
23For example, there are simultaneous import limitations into California that depend on the availability
of links from the Southwest to Southern California, the Northwest to California, and the operating gener-
ating capacity inside California. These limits are presently managed administratively with “nomograms”
that deﬁne the curtailments that are triggered when the constraints are binding.
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the network, with the rights paying a dividend (which could be negative) equal to the
diﬀerence in nodal prices at the two nodes due to congestion. We will focus on point-
to- point ﬁnancial rights here since they are being used in several areas of the U.S. and
appear to be the favored approach in the FERC’s SMD rules. Moreover, in theory the
values of point-to-point rights internalise network externalities associated with loop ﬂow
since they reﬂect the shadow prices on all lines aﬀected by an injection at one node and
an equivalent withdrawal at another node. The shadow price on a particular transmission
link, however, does not reﬂect the social value of the link to the network overall.
For the general case of a multi-node network with loop ﬂow, Hogan (1992) envisions
that point-to-point transmission rights will be deﬁned and allocated through a process
in which a set of all feasible (i.e., consistent with the transmission network) physical
combinations of bilateral contracts between injection and receipt points is ﬁrst calculated.
The process of deﬁning the feasible set must be conducted by the SO by performing a large
set of simulations of the use of the network under various supply and demand conditions
and contingencies (e.g. line outages) using load ﬂow models. The process envisioned for
deﬁning the feasible set appears to be purely physical in the sense that the SO does not
rely on prices or other valuation procedures to deﬁne the set of feasible rights. A second
process (e.g. grandfathered allocations to incumbents, auctions, bilateral trading) is then
used to deﬁne the speciﬁc combination of rights/capacities from within (or on the frontier
of) the feasible set that will be allocated initially to generators, marketers and/or load
serving entities. Once a speciﬁc combination of feasible transmission rights is deﬁned and
allocated they become the property of the holders. These rights may then be traded in
secondary markets.
Investments in new transmission capacity are translated into incremental transmission
rights through the eﬀects these investments have on shifting the initial frontier of the set
of all feasible bilateral transactions and the associated conﬁgurations of point-to-point
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capacities/rights. The literature generally assumes (a) that the initial feasible set and
shifts in its frontier are well deﬁned in the sense that there is no uncertainty about the
relevant parameters of the feasible set, (b) that the feasible set does not itself vary with
exogenous random variables, and (c) that the shifts in the frontier of the feasible set
do not make any rights/capacity combinations that were previously in the feasible set
infeasible, post investment, or else that eﬃcient trading arrangements are in place that
ensure reallocations to ensure feasibility.
There are both practical and theoretical issues that may undermine these assumptions.
As we have already discussed, the feasible set of bilateral schedules that can be accommo-
dated without causing congestion and the associated transmission capacities and accom-
panying rights depend on exogenous environmental parameters. While this fact literally
contradicts assumption b) above, the existing theory can straightforwardly be extended
in the usual manner by allocating state-contingent rights, as long as the contingencies can
be described (temperature, output of speciﬁc generators that aﬀect contingency limits,
conditions in interconnected control areas, etc.). The drawback of this extension is that
the large number of potential contingencies that are relevant for deﬁning and implement-
ing the feasibility requirement call for a large number of state-contingent rights, with
the concomitant problems that these create: large transaction costs, thinness and market
power in the secondary markets for these rights.
Assumption a) can also be questioned. In particular, system operators have sub-
stantial discretion in deﬁning and implementing security constraints, aﬀecting the actual
power ﬂows on the network in real time, and random line outages. Moreover, for complex
networks the physical feasibility evaluation necessary to deﬁne the numerous potential
conﬁgurations of transmission rights that are simultaneously feasible and the incremental
conﬁgurations of transmission rights created by new investments involves many discre-
tionary assumptions and is likely to be based on load ﬂow models that are approximations
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to real networks, are subject to SO discretion and may not be especially good approxi-
mations under stressed conditions when losses are signiﬁcant and contingency constraints
binding. These are the conditions when transmission rights are likely to be especially
valuable. What is modeled as being feasible and what is feasible in actual operations can
diﬀer, especially when reactive power and voltage constraints are important.
It should be clear as well that in practice the merchant transmission model cannot
operate “as if by an invisible hand,” since some de facto regulatory authority must have the
ability accurately to simulate load ﬂows on the network, apply contingency criteria, deﬁne
feasible sets and changes in feasible sets associated with transmission investments, and
ensure that rights allocations are consistent with feasibility under numerous contingencies.
Let us ﬁnally come to assumption c). It is clear that, except in radial networks, the
expansion of the network both creates new feasible allocations and makes some initially
feasible allocations infeasible. So, in general, the expansion may infringe on existing
property rights. This problem has been recognized in the academic literature, though
not very clearly in the policy arena, and it has been proposed that the merchant investor
building a new line leave existing property rights intact, which in general requires the
merchant investor to compensate for the loss of property rights by buying existing ones
and turning them back to initial owners who were expropriated. We now proceed to
elaborate on these issues for the case of a 3-node network with loop ﬂow.
The most elegant explanation of how the contract network framework can be applied in
practice to a simple network with loop ﬂow is provided by Bushnell and Stoft (1997), and
we follow their presentation very closely here. Figure 4 depicts the standard simple three-
node network. There is generation in the North, generation in the South and demand in
the East. The transmission lines connecting these nodes have capacities KNE, KSE and
KNS respectively as depicted in Figure 4.
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North
South
East
KNE
KSE
KNS
qN
qS
Figure 4
Assuming that the transmission links connecting the three nodes are of equal length
(resistance) and ignoring losses, the physical laws of electricity (Kirchoﬀ’s) determine the
ﬂows through the three transmission links associated with alternative conﬁgurations of
generation (qN and qS) in the North and South and consumption (qE) in the East. The
relevant constraints applicable to the deﬁnition of the feasible set of bilateral transactions
are:
2
3
qN +
1
3
qS ≤ KNE ,
1
3
qN +
2
3
qS ≤ KSE ,
1
3
qN − 1
3
qS ≤ KNS ,
qS + qN = qE.
The feasible combinations of qN and qS associated with each constraint are depicted
by lines in Figure 5 and the intersection of these sets deﬁnes the feasible set of bilateral
transactions.24 The feasible set is depicted as the hatched area in Figure 5 (equivalent to
Figure 2 is in Bushnell and Stoft 1997). The dispatch of the system and the allocation of
point-to-point transmission rights must lie within this feasible set.
24In what follows, KNS is assumed to be small relative to KNE and KSE . The capacities KNE and
KSE do not have to be equal, but the examples in Bushnell and Stoft (1997) assume that they are and
we will follow that assumption in the graphical presentation here.
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qS
KNE
KNS
KNS
qN
KSE
Feasible Set
Figure 5
Accommodating investment into this framework is tricky because grid expansions can
both make combinations of qN and qS and associated point-to-point rights feasible that
were not previously feasible and make some combinations of qN and qS and associated
point-to-point rights that were feasible pre-investment, infeasible post-investment. To see
this, it is again useful to follow Bushnell and Stoft (1997) and start with a radial network
that does not have a link connecting the North and the South, and, accordingly, no loop
ﬂow. A radial network of this type is depicted in Figure 6.
North
South
East
KNE
KSE
qN
qS
qE
Figure 6
For this network, the feasible set is very simple to deﬁne. It satisﬁes:
qN ≤ KNE
qS ≤ KSE
qN + qS = qE.
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Generation at each node is limited only by the capacity of the link connecting it to
the demand node. The feasible set of bilateral transactions for this radial network is
depicted as the hatched area in Figure 7. Figure 7 also depicts a hypothetical optimal
dispatch consistent with generation in the North being less costly than generation in the
South, but limited transmission capacity from North to East requires some more expensive
generation from the South to be dispatched to clear the market.25 The marginal cost of
the expensive generation that clears the market would also determine the market clearing
price in the East.
qN
KNE
KSE qS
Hypothetical optimal
dispatch with radial
network
(q∗N + q
∗
S = q
∗
E)
Feasible Set
Figure 7
Now let’s consider adding to this radial network a third link between North and South
to create the three-node network with loop ﬂow depicted in Figure 4. The changes in the
25The optimal dispatch does not have to be on the frontier of the feasible set in general, but can lie
inside of the frontier. This would be the case here if the marginal cost of generation at both nodes is
increasing in output and demand is at a level that does not require that generators operate at full capacity
to clear the market.
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feasible set resulting from this investment are displayed in Figure 8.
qN
KNE
KSE qS
Initial optimal dis-
patch with radial
network
Constrained optimal
dispatch in
three-node network
(qE ﬁxed)
Now infeasible
Now infeasible
New feasible
Figure 8
(This ﬁgure is equivalent to Figure 4 in Bushnell and Stoft 1997.) Some allocations that
were previously feasible are now infeasible and some allocations that were not previously
feasible are now feasible. In particular, the initial optimal dispatch is no longer feasible.
In order to go forward with the new line, the investor would (eﬀectively) have to buy
back suﬃcient rights from those who hold them initially to restore feasibility (or as in
Bushnell and Stoft require the investor to take rights that have negative values and require
payments rather than receiving dividends to restore feasibility). An eﬃcient economic
transmission rights reallocation process must complement any physical analysis of the
eﬀect of a transmission investment on the feasibility of the existing allocation of rights.
Otherwise, if the SO were to take the allocation of existing rights as ﬁxed when performing
a feasibility test, the set of investments that satisfy the constraint that no existing right
will be made infeasible will lead to a set of allowable investments that is much smaller
than the set of investments that increase social welfare.
With such an eﬃcient reallocation mechanism in place, Bushnell and Stoft show that
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that it will be most proﬁtable for the investor to acquire rights that lead to an alloca-
tion equal to the most eﬃcient dispatch given the constraints associated with the new
investment and associated network topology. Using their numerical assumptions, the new
eﬃcient dispatch and allocation of point-to-point ﬁnancial rights would be the point de-
picted in Figure 8 that involves less (cheap) generation in the North and more (expensive)
generation in the South than was the case without the new link. The new link is there-
fore ineﬃcient and should not be built and, indeed, Bushnell and Stoft show that the
obligation of the investor to restore feasibility will make this investment unproﬁtable for
a merchant investor under these assumptions.
This naturally raises the question of why transmission links such as the one between
North and South that cause loop ﬂow are so common. One reason might be that the post-
investment optimal dispatch lies in the small new feasible region in Figure 8, allowing
increased production from the cheap generator in the North. This could be the case,
for example, when demand is high and the optimal dispatch for the radial network is
further to the right on the KNE constraint in Figure 8, involving more generation from
(expensive) South. The new link would then have the eﬀect of increasing the feasible
(cheap) supplies from North and reducing the (expensive) supplies from South to balance
supply and (higher) demand, by eﬀectively increasing the capacity from North to East via
South. But, this situation requires that it is less costly to invest in transmission capacity
to increase supplies from the North over an indirect path (North to South to East) than
simply to increase the capacity of the direct link from North to East.
If the new link does not move the eﬃcient dispatch into the new areas of the feasible
set, the third link between generation nodes in the standard three-node network reduces
social welfare because it is a binding constraint on low-cost generation schedules which
would otherwise be accommodated without congestion on the direct links between each
generation node and the demand node. This link only makes sense when we recognize
47
that one of the other links may fail and the third link provides an alternative path for
delivering supplies to satisfy demand (Joskow and Tirole 2000, p. 477). So, this link will
have negative value under some contingencies and positive value under others. Adding
the link will reduce the feasible capacity from at least one node to another under some
contingencies and increase it under others.26
We can see this by extending the Bushnell and Stoft’s (1997) examples to take account
of line outages. Let’s go back to the radial network depicted in Figure 6. Assume now
that that the capacity of the link from North to East is reduced as a consequence of
equipment failures or other contingencies; assume that the capacity is cut by 1/3. The
new feasible set is depicted in Figure 9. The new optimal dispatch involves less cheap
generation and more expensive generation and increases total generation costs.
Now we consider the eﬀects of adding a link between North and South under the
contingency that the capacity of the NE link is reduced due to a line outage. The new
feasible set (under the condition that capacity on the link between North and East has
26This is a potential problem with link-based rights. The shadow price on the link between North and
South is positive in both states of nature and could look proﬁtable to an investor if she could ignore the
impacts on the rest of the network.
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been cut by a third) is depicted in Figure 9.
qN
KNE
2/3KNE
KSEKNS
KNS
qS
New feasible
Now
infeasible
Now infeasible
Hypothetical optimal
dispatch with radial
network and no line outages
Optimal dispatch with
three-node network and
line outage
Constrained dispatch with
line outage on a radial
network
Feasible set with
line outage on
three-node network
Figure 9
As before, adding a line that causes loop ﬂow makes some allocations that were pre-
viously feasible now infeasible and others that were previously infeasible are now feasible.
As portrayed in Figure 9, the link in this case makes it possible to increase generation at
(cheap) North and to reduce generation at (expensive) South when the capacity of the NE
link is reduced signiﬁcantly. Accordingly, the third link will reduce generation costs (and
perhaps reduce the probability that demand will have to be shed to balance supply and
demand) when there are transmission line outages of the type examined here. Whether
it is an eﬃcient investment will depend on the beneﬁts of the link during contingencies
like these (and others when it is valuable), the costs of the link during conditions when it
is not “needed” and leads to an ineﬃcient dispatch, and the cost of the investment. It is
clear that non-contingent transmission rights cannot be deﬁned properly to capture the
varying valuations of a transmission investment under the many contingencies that char-
acterize real electric power networks and provide the right incentives to support eﬃcient
investments. Only contingent rights provide the proper incentives. Moreover, for any
mechanism like this to work well a liquid competitive secondary market for rights would
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have to exist to make it possible for investors to easily buy and sell rights at their com-
petitive market values to restore feasibility and to allow welfare enhancing investments to
go forward.
The success of any property-based system in attracting eﬃcient levels of investment
depends on the ability to deﬁne and enforce clear and consistent property rights. This
appears to be an especially challenging problem on an electric power network with loop
ﬂow where the feasible set of property rights and their eﬃcient allocation (i.e. not just
their value) are contingent on changing supply and demand conditions, the application of
contingency constraints by the system operator,27 and their interaction with new invest-
ments.
9 Coordination issues
9.1 General considerations
As noted earlier, the optimality of merchant investment requires that the net demand
and supply curves in the wholesale market represent the true demands and supplies of
energy market participants. Most of the literature supporting transmission investment is
static in the sense (a) there is no uncertainty about supply, demand or prices, and (b) all
investments in generation and transmission occur simultaneously. However, investments
in transmission are long-lived sunk investments and their value depends on changing
and uncertain supply and demand conditions over many future years. The economic
calculus necessarily involves forecasting future supply and demand conditions which are
uncertain, including changes in locational supply and demand conditions resulting from
future investments in generating and transmission capacity, and the associated uncertain
nodal prices. As a result, the presentation of the supply and demand functions in the
27As we earlier noted, a further complication may be that the contingency constraints applied to
deﬁne transmission capacity and the network topology used to manage congestion depend in part on
the location, size and operating status of speciﬁc generating units on the network, eﬀectively making
transmission capacity endogenous.
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previous ﬁgures, and the standard formulations of these problems must stand for the long-
term demand and supply curves. The latter of course reﬂect the possibility of investments
in generation and (for consumers) bypass via self-generation. Existing and new electricity
producers formulate investment plans, whose implementation depends on the expectations
of market conditions; similarly large and small users may adopt equipment that allow
them to switch to alternative sources of energy. For example, investments in the North
will be unproﬁtable if they are not accompanied by a strengthening of the North-South
line. Conversely, the reinforcement of the line won’t be proﬁtable if the congestion rent
is too small, that is if no investment occurs in the North.
In principle, this coordination can be achieved through a planning procedure, in which
all interested parties announce their (price-contingent) investment plans. Such coordina-
tion however becomes more involved if either some party (or coalition of parties) have
market power or an incentive to block investments to create it or if investments are
lumpy. Mechanisms designed to aggregate stakeholder preferences to make choices about
major transmission investments have not been particularly successful.28
For example, the owner(s) of the existing capacity K0 of the line may announce a
substantial reinforcement in the hope of attracting investment in the North, and later
not implement this capacity building. The price collapse in the North brought about
by “excessive” investment in generation there increases the congestion rent and beneﬁts
the transmission owner. Similarly, investments in generation in the South might be an-
nounced, that are meant to preempt a reinforcement of the transmission line and will
never be implemented.
In general, proper incentives must be put in place in order to prevent such manipu-
lations of other parties’ investments. For example, proposed transmission projects that
are recognized and approved by the system operator might be required to post a bond to
28See Chisari et. al. (2001) for a discussion of the experience in Argentina.
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secure their commitment that would be forfeited if the project is not completed (subject
to force majeur exceptions).
9.2 Does the Coase theorem apply?
It is sometimes argued that the problems created by lumpy investments can be resolved
through negotiations between the various market participants who will beneﬁt from the
investment. That is, that the “Coase theorem” applies. There are many reasons, exposited
in the following box, to believe that negotiations among the aﬀected market participants
is unlikely to solve the problems.
Lumpy projects: Will winners get on board and losers be compensated?
As was discussed in section 5, the price system does not supply the proper signals
when the transmission investment has a substantial impact on nodal prices (according
to this deﬁnition, a very small transmission investment creating a new link that causes
loop ﬂow — as in section 8 — is a lumpy investment). Merchant investment, to
be eﬃcient, then must involve some stakeholders process. Its proponents build on
the Coase Theorem to argue that winners will participate in the funding of socially
desirable projects, while losers will pay enough so to prevent socially undesirable ones.
There however are several issues with this argument, some general and well-known,
and some more speciﬁc to the context:
• Transaction costs : Coasian bargaining involves transaction costs especially when
the number of stakeholders is large.
• Asymmetric information: In order to reach an eﬃcient agreement, parties must
make reasonable demands. When imperfectly informed as to what others will accept,
participants in a bargaining process may end up being too greedy, resulting in an
ineﬃcient bargaining breakdown.
• Absence of future players: eﬃciency requires that all parties be present to negotiate
a deal. Future newcomers in generation, transmission and consumption by deﬁnition
do not sit at the bargaining table and so their interests will not be accounted for by
the existing parties.
• Non-excludability of winners and free riding : The design of restructured electricity
markets imposes that prices be uniform at a given node: this is mechanistically so in
the case of pools, but it applies as well to bilateral-transactions-based systems. Thus,
a consumer in the South beneﬁts from the reinforcement of the North-South line and
has no incentive to join other consumers in the South and other winners (producers
in the North) to contribute to defray the transmission investment if such free-riding
does not prevent the investment from being made. The current market design does not
call for exclusive rights for the ﬁnancing parties, and thus encourages free riding in a
merchant investment context.
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• Hold-up of potential losers : To reach an eﬃcient agreement when a socially ineﬃcient
transmission investment is being considered, it must be the case that losers be able to
“bribe” the winners not to make this investment. While this bribe enables an eﬃcient
outcome “ex post”, when anticipated “ex ante”, it may provide parties with the wrong
incentives.
To see this, consider a ﬁxed demand qS in the South (corresponding to gross surplus
vqS — we assume an inelastic demand for computational simplicity). The unit cost of
building generation capacity in the South is IG ≡ c0qS, where c0 is the per-unit cost of
investment. This capacity can be built by a monopoly generator (the analysis can be
altered to accommodate the case of a competitive set of generators in the South). The
variable (ex post) cost of producing qS is cqS.
Suppose now that, at cost
IT > IG,
a link with capacity exceeding qS from another region (North) to South can be built.
There is already plenty of competitive generation in the North at some variable cost
c. Thus, the building of the transmission line involves a social loss of IT − IG if the
generation in the South is not yet built and of IT if this generation is already in place.
Now suppose that there is investment in generation in the South (the eﬃcient solution).
The monopolist charges v per unit, resulting in proﬁt (v − c) qS (gross of the investment
cost IT ). Suppose next that the consumers form a coalition and threaten to build the
transmission line. If they do so, Bertrand competition brings the price down to c, and
so the threat is credible if
(v − c) qS − IT > 0,
which we will assume. Coasian bargaining implies that the monopoly generator will
bribe the consumer coalition not to implement the project, where the bribe b lies in an
interval:
b ∈ [(v − c) qS − IT , (v − c) qS] .
The lower bound of the interval corresponds to the coalition surplus from bypass, and
the upper bound the quasi-rent enjoyed by the monopolist in the absence of bypass.
So, if β denotes the coalition’s bargaining power:
b = β [(v − c) qS] + (1− β) [(v − c) qS − IT ]
= (v − c) qS − (1− β)IT .
Knowing that it exposes itself to paying a ransom, the generator in the South invests
if and only if
(1− β)IT ≥ IG,
a condition that is violated unless β is small. So, if the coalition does not hold, the
eﬃcient investment in generation does not occur.
Two comments are in order. First, the ineﬃciency can be prevented by moving Coasian
bargaining to an ex ante stage — that is, in eﬀect by having the generator and the
consumers engage in long-term contacting. [This solution of course raises other issues,
such as the absence ex ante of relevant parties at the bargaining table; or the barrier-
to-entry potential of long-term contracts as studied by Aghion and Bolton (1987).]
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Alternatively, an ex ante agreement that does not lock in the consumers must be akin
to greenmail in that it must involve a commitment by consumers and/ or transmission
enabler (in the case of a scarce corridor) not to play this bypass-and-holdup game.
Second, the same logic applies to the situation described in ﬁgure 1. Consider an inef-
ﬁcient reinforcement of the line that fully eliminates congestion and whose investment
cost lies between the congestion cost and the sum of the congestion cost and the con-
gestion rent. Then, a merchant investor can hold up consumers, producers and rights
owners collectively, a behavior that would have an impact on the ex ante incentives for
consumption-, production-, and transmission-related investments.
9.3 Gaming between merchant investment projects
Last, we conclude this section with an example of possible gaming between merchant
projects rather than between a merchant project and producers or consumers.
Gaming and coordination of merchant investment projects
An important beneﬁt of market mechanisms is the freedom economic agents enjoy in
their investment decisions. They don’t need to coordinate with other agents. In the
case of electric networks, coordination will be needed not only between transmission and
generation investments, as we just discussed, but also between transmission investments.
To illustrate this, consider the pair of transmission investment projects depicted in ﬁgure
10. Complementary investments from North to Middle and from Middle to South will
allow cheap power to ﬂow from North to South. While this pair is really a single investment
from an economic viewpoint, the investments may be undertaken by diﬀerent entities for
technological reasons (one is an AC line and the other a DC line and the two companies
have diﬀerent expertise) or other reasons (for example, through separate ownerships of
rights of way or diﬀerent political jurisdictions enabling siting).
N pN
KNM
M pM
KMS
S pS
Figure 10
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Suppose the two complementary projects are built (that is, the standard “coordination
failure” does not arise) and that companies choose their capacities KNM and KMS. The
value of the point-to-point rights are
KNM (pM − pN) ,
and
KMS (pS − pM) ,
respectively. The incentive for gaming comes from the fact that the lower-capacity line
grabs the entire rights’ value: Suppose, for instance, that KMS < KNM . Then, pM = pN
while pS > pM . This gives rise to a game in which each would like to have a capacity
slightly lower than the other. Hence, none dares to move ﬁrst as the other will then make
sure to collect the entire rent.
To be certain, this example is extreme, but it illustrates a general point: Merchant invest-
ment is conducive to preemption (see section 5) and war-of-attrition strategies (Tirole
1988, pp.311-314). These detrimental behaviors can be avoided through a centralized
process involving various forms of incentives to promote incentive compatibility. But, by
so doing, the market moves closer to a centralized process.
10 Forward markets and commitment
As we discussed earlier, merchant investment is likely to be most appropriate for major
new links that expand the geographic “footprint” of the transmission network, rather
than for network deepening investments that involve enhancements to existing facilities.
Constructing a major new line, however, involves both a long lead time and substantial
uncertainty as to the availability of a crucial input, namely the various authorizations
needed to build the line, and as to the nodal prices of electricity in the distant future.
This gives rise to three concerns:
• Availability of ﬁnancing.
Merchant investment is a high-powered-incentives activity. Merchants thus bear a
substantial long-term risk. To obtain ﬁnancing, they probably will want to oﬄoad a good
part of this risk.29 One technique for doing involves entering into ﬁnancial arrangements
with generators and load-serving entities. The latter then still face energy price risk as
29For theoretical foundations for the desirability of this oﬄoading, see Holmstro¨m-Tirole (2000).
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well as (if this transmission project cannot be brought to completion) counterparty risk.
In principle, some insurance should also be supplied by non-stakeholders. For reasons that
have received insuﬃcient attention in economic theory, such long-term forward markets
are usually poorly developed, though. This fact can make it hard for merchant investors
to raise ﬁnancing.
• Credibility vis-a´-vis projects with shorter lead times.
Merchant transmission projects that increase capacity between an import constrained
area with high nodal prices and an export constrained area with low nodal prices are, in
a sense, substitutes for generation projects of equivalent capacity inside the import con-
strained area. While the merchant transmission project does not compete directly with
this kind of generation project, it does make it possible for generators outside the con-
strained area to compete with existing and new generators inside the import constrained
area. Suppose for instance that a merchant investor plans to invest in a new North-South
line, whose acquisition of siting permits plus actual construction will take say 10 years.30
If the transmission project is not built assume that a generator with equivalent capacity
would be built in the South and that such a project would take only 3 years to obtain
siting approvals and to be constructed. There is room for only one of these two alternative
ways of reducing the price wedge between North and South. The merchant transmission
investor is at a strategic disadvantage even if his project is socially more valuable. If
most of the costs involved in building a new line are sunk after the ﬁrst two years, then
the merchant investor is likely to cancel his project if the new generation plant in the
South is built. Knowing this, the generator may well try to use his short-term investment
period to preempt the transmission project, and this even if the merchant investor has
30Transmission lines do not take very long to build once they have obtained siting permits. However,
for major new transmission corridors, the permitting process can be very lengthy.
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announced his intention and has started (limited) work on this project.31
• Regulatory uncertainty and opportunism.
Government and regulators have substantial discretion over the proﬁtability of energy
projects. In the case of the construction of a new line, they will ﬁrst aﬀect the probability
that the company receives the authorizations needed to build it. And, once it is built,
the choice of rating paradigm (which determines the number of rights allocated to the
merchant), the imposition of energy price caps, the deﬁnition of incentives for the System
Operator (see section 7 above), the build-up of parallel lines under diﬀerent incentives
(e.g., by a Transco regulated under cost-of-service and aiming at reducing nodal price
diﬀerences or market power in the South) all impact the merchant investor’s long-term
return.
While this commitment problem exists for all investments, it is partially mitigated on
the short end by institutional factors (short-term stability of the regulatory environment,
5-year regulatory commitments, ) and by the current regulators’ reputation concerns. But
long-term commitments are less desirable and administrations change. This is why long
term investments whose payoﬀs are heavily dependent on government policies are often
performed either by a State-owned enterprise or by a utility under some cost-of-service
scheme, but not by a private company under a high-powered incentive scheme.32
11 Conclusion
We have examined the performance attributes of a “merchant transmission” model in
which investments in electric transmission capacity rely upon competition and free en-
try to exploit proﬁtable transmission investment opportunities rather than on regulated
31Such timing issues are of course not speciﬁc to transmission investments. But the latter are particular
vulnerable to preemption strategies due to their long lead time.
32Unless legal protection against expropriation may be supplied by the court system, which requires
that expropriation take blatant, rather than subtle forms.
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monopoly transmission companies. In return for investment in additional transmission
capacity, merchant investors receive property rights that allow them to collect congestion
revenues equal to the diﬀerence in nodal energy prices associated with the incremental
point-to-point transmission capacity their investments create. The value of these rights
to receive congestion revenues represent the revenues merchant investors receive to cover
the capital and operating costs of these investments. Previous theoretical research has
demonstrated that under a fairly stringent set of assumptions (a) all eﬃcient investments
in transmission capacity will be proﬁtable and (b) all ineﬃcient investments will be unprof-
itable. These results undermine the traditional assumption that transmission networks
are “natural monopolies” that must be subject to regulation of their maintenance and
operating decisions as well as their investment decisions. If they are correct in practice,
they would lead to the remarkable conclusion that both the generation of electricity and
the transmission of electricity can be largely deregulated.
Our work examines how these results are aﬀected by introducing assumptions that
more accurately reﬂect the physical and economic attributes of transmission networks.
We argue ﬁrst that there are many investment opportunities that involve enhancements
to the existing transmission network and that are physically and operationally insep-
arable from the incumbent transmission owner’s network. These “network deepening”
investments can be undertaken most eﬃciently by the incumbent transmission owner. If
incumbents were able to pursue these investments on a merchant basis they would be able
to extract signiﬁcant monopoly rents and would underinvest in these types of transmission
capacity expansion opportunities. Accordingly, these types of investments are not good
candidates for governance by the merchant investment model. Investments that expand
the footprint of the existing transmission network by building major new transmission
lines, what we call ”network expansion investments,” are the most likely candidates for
successful merchant investment. However, we show how various attributes of transmis-
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sion investments lead to market imperfections and ineﬃciencies with the merchant model.
When there are imperfections in the competitive wholesale electricity markets that lead
nodal spot electricity prices to depart from their eﬃcient levels, investment incentives
will be distorted. For example, when unregulated generators have market power, nodal
energy prices will be distorted from their eﬃcient levels. These distortions may lead
to over-investment or under-investment depending upon where on the network electric-
ity generators have market power. Imperfect government interventions to control market
power in competitive wholesale electricity markets may also distort investment incentives.
The absence of a good set of liquid forward markets for trading wholesale electricity at
all points on the network is a further deterrent to eﬃcient investment.
Network expansion investments that are most conducive to supply by competitive
entrants are also likely to be characterized by economies of scale or “lumpiness.” We
show how economies of scale will lead to under-investment, to monopoly pre-emption
of competitive generation or transmission investments, and distort the timing of invest-
ments. We argue that these problems are unlikely to be resolved by relying on bilateral
or multilateral negotiations among the market participants who gain and lose from these
investments. Indeed, opportunities for multilateral bargaining may further distort invest-
ment incentives.
We also show that the types of non-contingent transmission property rights that have
been assumed to be awarded to investors in transmission capacity are poorly matched to
the stochastic characteristics of transmission networks and investments in them. Instead,
transmission property rights that are contingent on exogenous variations in transmission
capacity and reﬂect the diversiﬁcation attributes of new investments would be necessary
to properly align investment incentives with the stochastic attributes of transmission
networks. We explore these property rights deﬁnition and allocation issues for both radial
networks and networks with loop ﬂow. Unfortunately, deﬁning and allocating contingent
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property rights that provide eﬃcient investment incentives is also likely to be inconsistent
with the development of liquid competitive markets for these rights or derivatives on
them.
Under the merchant transmission model the ownership and maintenance of transmis-
sion facilities are to be separated from decisions regarding security-constrained bid-based
dispatching of generators and price-responsive demand on the network and managing re-
liability criteria and constraints. The latter decisions are to be made by independent
system operators that are unaﬃliated with generators, energy marketers or transmission
owners. We show that maintenance and operating decisions made by transmission owners
are interdependent with dispatch and network reliability decisions made by monopoly
system operators. Separating these decisions potentially leads to moral hazard problems
and associated ineﬃciencies. Transmission owners and system operators must have a
compatible set of incentives to avoid these ineﬃciencies, but designing these incentives is
challenging. Vertical integration between transmission ownership and system operations is
likely to reduce these incentive problems and, if transmission owners are also independent
of generator and marketing of power, may be a superior organizational structure.
As a practical matter it is appears to be unlikely that we can rely primarily on compet-
itive merchant investment to provide eﬃcient investments in transmission infrastructure
necessary to support eﬃcient competitive wholesale power markets. The challenge for
future research is to develop regulatory mechanisms that facilitate eﬃcient investment
and operating decisions by incumbent regulated transmission network owners, stimulate
merchant investment when it is more eﬃcient, and convey the net beneﬁts of eﬃcient
investment and operating decisions made by both regulated and merchant transmission
owners to consumers. Developing good performance based regulatory mechanism to gov-
ern both the behavior of incumbent transmission owners and to stimulate eﬃcient in-
vestment decisions by incumbents and merchant developers is an essential feature of a
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system that relies on competitive wholesale power markets whose participants depend on
the transmission network to support wholesale electricity market competition.
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